西岡達裕「原爆外交、一九四五年」（日本国際政治学会『国際政治』第118号、1998年）

国際政治・アメリカ研究

「原爆外交、一九四五年」

西岡　達裕

（日本国際政治学会『国際政治』第118号、1998年）　

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　はじめに

　第二次世界大戦直後におけるアメリカ合衆国のいわゆる「原爆外交」
（atomic diplomacy）は、冷戦の起源をめぐる歴史論争のなかでも
とりわけ論争的な主題である。

　原爆外交という言葉を最初に用いたのは、一九四五年に発表され
たソヴィエト連邦の雑誌記事であり、その言葉には、当時、原子爆
弾を独占していたアメリカの強腰な外交姿勢にたいする批判の意
味合いがこめられていた。ただし、大戦直後のアメリカが原爆を明
示的な威嚇の手段とした事例は、実際には存在しない。それゆえ、
時の国務長官は、原爆外交の存在自体を否定したし、歴史学者の中
にも同様の見解をとる者がある。

　しかしながら、そのような見解は、ソ連の側にはそれが存在する
と感じられたという事実を無視している点で一方的であり、冷戦と
核軍備競争の起源を考察する際に有意義な視角を提供するとは考え
られない。また、アメリカは大戦直後の数カ月間、原爆問題をソ連
との交渉の議題に上げなかったが、それはたんなる無策ではなく交
渉の回避という意図的な政策であったのである。

　本稿は、筆者なりに渉猟し得たアメリカ政府未公刊文書をもとに、
一九四五年、アメリカの原爆外交がいかにして成立し、展開された
のかを考察する外交史の試みである。

Summary

"Atomic Diplomacy 1945: The Policy Process in 1945,"

NISHIOKA, Tatsuhiro

Japan Association of International Relations ed.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Vol 118 (May 1998)

This paper treats the policy process of U. S. atomic diplomacy in 1945. During the Second World War, the United States was engaged in the development of atomic bombs. The project was treated as top secret, becoming public only when the first bombs were used against the Japanese. At that time a Presidential statement was supposed to be made.

Even after the end of the war, however, President Truman declared no definite foreign policy regarding the atomic bomb. The reason was that during his stay in Potsdam he had judged cooperation with the Russians not to be practical at least in this matter. Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, decided to monopolize the bomb, anticipating that the monopoly would render the Russians “more manageable.”

At the London meeting of foreign ministers held in September, Byrnes talked “with the implicit threat of the bomb in his pocket, ” a tactic that met with no success at all. Truman and some of his advisors started doubting the wisdom of Byrnes' atomic diplomacy. In October, Truman made it clear that the U. S. would undertake the problem of international control of atomic energy.

In Washington, some opponents of Byrnes' diplomacy advocated approaching the Russians directly and more frankly, while Byrnes still wanted no approach at all. In November, Truman, who thought he must go forward but do so slowly, expressed his hope for atomic disarmament and proposed the establishment of an advisory commission within the United Nations Organization. This was the very step the opponents of Byrnes were most afraid of, because the Russians would regard it as a means to gang up against them. As was expected, the State Department repeatedly heard the news that the Russian people blamed the U. S. for threatening them with the bombs. In the end, the U. S. proposed another meeting of foreign ministers.

Thus the Moscow conference was scheduled for December 1945 and a policy committee for the conference was set up. Draft proposals were elaborated, including a proposal for bilateral negotiations. At this time, both Truman and Byrnes realized the need for liberal proposals which could help build mutual confidence between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. But such proposals were not submitted to the conference, for American Congressional leaders were violently against them.

In Moscow, the Russians agreed to the establishment of the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission. But they did so because they could ensure their veto power on any recommendations it might make. Despite the apparent success of the Moscow conference, the wheel of the nuclear arms race was rolling steadily by the end of 1945.

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